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The Communication between Substances and the 
Unity of the Human Being in Petrus Hispanus’ 





This paper aims to describe the development of the doctrine of the plurality of substantial 
forms in the Sententia cum questionibus in libros I, II de anima Aristotelis, attributed to 
Petrus Hispanus, and to emphasize the importance of the concept of ‘communication’, 
which is used by this and other authors of the 13th century.
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Resumen. La comunicación entre sustancias en la unidad del ser humano en el comentario al 
De anima de Pedro Hispano
Este artículo pretende mostrar el desarrollo de la doctrina de la pluralidad de formas sustan-
ciales en la Sententia cum questionibus in libros I, II de anima Aristotelis, atribuida a Pedro 
Hispano, y enfatizar la importancia del concepto de ‘comunicación’, que fue utilizado por 
éste y otros autores del siglo xiii. 
Palabras clave: Petrus Hispanus; comentarios al De anima; pluralidad de formas sustan-
ciales; comunicación
In the lectures of Sententia cum questionibus in libros I, II de anima Aristotelis1, 
attributed to Petrus Hispanus, we find some of the positions that prevailed in 
1. Published by Manuel Alonso Alonso (1944) in Obras Filosóficas II: Comentario al “De 
anima” de Aristóteles, Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 1944. This 
edition is based on the manuscript of Cracow, Biblijoteka Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, 
726, ff. 41r-134r. The discovery of another manuscript (Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Mar-
ciana, Cod. Lat. Z 253 (= 1826), ff. 54r-99r) with many variants justifies the new edition 
on which we are working; see Pontes (1976). For some selected bibliography about the 
work, see Meirinhos (2005, 2011), Pontes (1964), Bazán (2002), Gauthier (1984: 239*-
242*). This paper is part of my current research project that includes a preparation of the 
critical edition of the Sententia cum questionibus in libros I, II de anima Aristotelis. The texts 
from this work quoted in this article come from our edition in progress.
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the psychology of the first half of the 13th century. Among them the doctrine 
of the plurality of substantial forms in the soul has a key position2.
The soul is defined as a substance composed of spiritual matter and form, 
following the Fons uitae by Ibn Gabirol3. This substance is also the form of 
the body to which the soul is united. This double reality, as a substance and 
as a form, is the origin of the diversity of its operations: some of them are 
performed with the body or in the body; others are performed with no rela-
tion to the body, only departing from the soul’s essence, which is simple, 
diaphanous and luminous4. The Neoplatonic view of the soul, transmitted 
via the Latin tradition itself, as well as the Arabic, emphasizes the understand-
ing of the body in its duality of limits and an instrument of a superior entity, 
which is an entelechy or substance. This substantialization of the soul, accept-
ed by all Latin pre-Thomist authors, provides major theoretical difficulties 
concerning the unity of the human being only in the dimension of the met-
aphysical speculation: the discontinuity between the corporeal and the 
spiritual poses a question about the relation between the two ontologically 
diverse things.
One of the proposals for overcoming this difficulty is the articulation of 
the plurality of substantial forms, a doctrine whose paternity should be attrib-
uted to Ibn Gabirol (Bazán, 1967: 71-3) and that was followed by many 
 
2. Some studies of reference are Zavalloni (1951), Bazán (1969; 1997), Gilson (1980), Wéber 
(1991), and Dales (1995). Some more recent works include Bieniak (2010), Lenzi (2011), 
and Silva (2012). On this subject, related to the origin of the soul in Petrus Hispanus’ 
attributed works (especially in the De animalibus), see Pontes (1964).
3. “Sexta positio scribitur in libro Fontis uite quia in omnibus natura forme et natura materie 
siue sint corporalia siue spiritualia. Set triplex est materia, scilicet materia spiritualis et 
materia corporalis et materia media. In substantiis autem spiritualibus est materia spiritua-
lis, in corporalibus est materia corporalis. In corporibus autem superioribus est materia 
media. Corporalis autem dicitur materia que habet naturam partitionis et dimentionis et 
que est subiecta transmutationi et quia hec est in elementis propter hoc in eis est materia 
corporalis. In corporibus autem superioribus est materia habens naturam partitionis et 
dimentionis, non tamen est subiecta transmutationi, et propter hoc dicitur media, quia a 
parte illa qua habet naturam dimentionis dicitur coporalis, a parte illa qua non est subiec-
ta transmutationi dicitur spiritualis, quia materia spiritualis nec habet dimensionem nec 
est subiecta transmutationi. Huic autem opinioni uel positioni adherentes dicimus et pon-
imus quod in omnibus substantiis spiritualibus est materia spiritualis et forma, et sic omnes 
composite sunt, et ideo dicendum est quod in anima intellectiua est compositio ex materia 
et forma uel ex quo est” Sententia cum questionibus I, lec. 3, q. 4 (ed. Alonso, 251-2). Cf. 
Meirinhos (2011: 54-60).
4. “Anima intellectiua habet duplicem aspectum: unum, scilicet ad creatorem a quo exit in 
esse quem cognoscit, quoniam illius est causa. Iterum habet aspectum ad substantias supe-
riores sibi similes separatas a materia et ad corpus quod dirigit et ad ea que ad corpus 
ordinantur que sub ipsa sunt. Et secundum duplicem aspectum duplicem habet potentiam: 
unam per quam comparatur ad superiora et per quam nata est separari et que est lumen 
ipsius anime illuminata, et hec potentia est intellectus agens, et hec est ei propria” Senten-
tia cum questionibus I, lec. 6, q. 1 (ed. Alonso, 294-5); “Anima enim illuminata est a primo 
et data est ei uirtus a principio ut cognoscat se ipsam et diuinum bonum” Sententia cum 
questionibus, QP1, q. 2 (ed. Alonso, 66; rep. in 167); etc.
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Latin authors from the 13th century, such as Philip the Chancellor, Adam of 
Bockfeld, Robert Kilwardby and others5. The adoption of this model does not 
indicate the non-existence of disagreements among them about how this plu-
rality is articulated6. Nevertheless, they all agreed on conceiving the existence 
of a plurality of forms in the animated being, which would be in charge of the 
different actions that occur within it or with it. This plurality includes not 
only the organic dynamism of the body itself but also the operations of a 
cognitive character. 
According to Petrus Hispanus in the Sententia, this multiplicity of opera-
tions is unified around two main perfections of the body. One is the form of 
the mixture, forma mixtionis, the principles of which are related to the ele-
ments and their properties. This form is what causes corporeal operations 
without the agency of the soul, the forma corporeitatis. 
The other is a form added to this mixture, forma addita mixtioni, which is 
the only substantial form stricto sensu, being the supreme perfection of the 
body as an animated body7:
Ad primam rationem in contrarium dicendum est quod forma corporis mixti 
est duplex: quedam est forma corporis mixti que est forma mixtionis. Alia 
autem est addita mixtioni. Loquendo ergo de forma mixti que est forma mix-
tionis uerum est quod ipsa est principium alicuius operationis per naturam 
alicuius elementi in ea determinati, quia resultat ex formis elementaribus et 
maxime est illa forma principium operationis per naturam caloris, quia forme 
elementares, que sunt maxime principia operationum, maxime sunt habentes 
naturam caloris.
Loquendo autem de forma mixti que non est forma mixtionis set addita 
mixtioni, talis non est principium operationis per naturam alicuius elementi, 
quia non resultat ex elementis, set est principium operationis per sui substan-
tiam. Est enim substantia simplex et ideo multarum operationum est prin-
cipium per naturam sue spiritualitatis et sue substantie et non per naturam 
alicuius elementi. Talis autem forma mixti est anima8.
This forma addita mixtioni is the soul, which unifies the diverse spiritual 
forms, that is, the vegetative, sensitive and intellective forms, as is proposed in 
5. It is not completely resolved that the debate on the pluralism or unitarism was defended 
by Philip the Chancellor, whose Summa was very influential, cf. Bazán (1969: 55), Bieniak 
(2010: 123) and Silva (2012: 13).
6. The adoption of this model does not indicate the non-existence of disagreements among 
them regarding the substantialization of these forms or the manner in which these forms 
are related one to another, cf. Bazán (1969: 32-3).
7. Cf: “Habet enim corpus duplicem perfectionem: unam scilicet a forma mixtionis et hec est 
eius perfectio in genere mixtionum. Alia habet que est addita mixtioni qua corpus est id 
quod est in genere animatorum et hec est anima et sic quodam modo aduenit completo, 
quodam modo incompleto ipsa anima adueniendo corpori nec habet corpus secundum 
hoc duas formas substantiales nisi secundum diuersas naturas” Sententia cum questionibus 
II, lec. 1, q. 4.2 (ed. Alonso, 516-7).
8. Sententia cum questionibus I, lec. 9, q. 1 (ed. Alonso, 348-9).
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Aristotle’s De anima9. Despite the fact that all of them are spiritual, these 
forms present divergences because of their relationships with the flesh. The 
intellective is above them, and its performance is independent of the corpore-
al instrument, being incorruptible and completely spiritual. 
To save the spiritual nature of this intellective part of the soul, the author 
finally stated that the soul is not a unique substance with three potencies, but 
it is composed by several substantial forms10:
Circa primam questionem sic proceditur et queritur utrum anima uegetabilis 
et sensibilis et intellectiua in homine sint una substantia uel differant secun-
dum substantias. […] Solutio. […] Et nos in principio sustinemus primam 
opinionem gratia disputationis11, uia uero Aristotelis et aliorum philosopho-
rum uidetur ostendere illas differentias anime differre secundum substantiam 
et non solum secundum potencias, et ideo illam uiam sustinemus et ponimus 
quod ille tres differentie anime in substantiis et potenciis differunt in eisdem 
et in diuersis. Questio autem ista querit de diuersitate intellectiue ad alias duas 
et dicimus quod differt ab illis secundum substantiam et secundum potencias 
in eodem et in diuersis12.
In fact, not only the intellective form is different from the non-intellective 
form, but also the sensible is different from the vegetative. In sum, there are 
three substantial forms, id est, three substances:
Circa secundum sic proceditur et queritur habito quod anima intellectiua 
differat secundum substantiam ab anima uegetabili et sensibili prout sunt in 
eodem, queritur de opinione quorumdam qui ponunt quod anima uegetabi-
lis et sensibilis prout sunt in eodem non differunt secundum substantiam et 
 9. It must be stressed that for Petrus the books on the animals and vegetables deal with body 
itself: “Dicendum est quod in diuersis scienciis determinatur de anima et corpore animato, 
quia in corpore animato sunt multa. Primum est corpus et dispositiones eius ets uarum 
partium et diuersitas earum, et diuerse nature animalium et plantarum et diuerse complex-
iones eorum et diuersa loca in quibus habitant et sunt, et a parte ista determinatur de cor-
pore animato in libro Animalium et in libro Vegetabilium. Secundum est natura anime, qua 
informatur, et operationes anime, que egrediuntur ab anima supra corpus, et sic de ipso 
determinantur in sciencia De anima et propter hoc intitulatur ab anima, quia determinatur 
in illa sciencia de corpore animato a parte operationum egredientium ab anima determina-
tarum supra ipsum. Tercium est natura operationum quas habet corpus a parte corporis et 
que contra hunt naturam abeo; et sic de eo in minoribus libris, sicut in libro De sensu et 
sensato, De morte et uita, De sompno et uigilia. Diuersitas autem istarum scienciarum est a 
diuersitate diuersorum principiorum, quia alia sunt principia et rationes corporis a parte 
operationum anime quam a parte suarum operationum. Et iterum operationes que egredi-
untur a corpore addunt rationes et principia supra complexiones corporum, et sic patet 
diuersitas huius sciencie ab aliis” Sententia cum questionibus, QP2 q. 1 (ed. Alonso, 88).
10. See the different meaning that forma substantialis has in Robert Kilwardby; according to 
Silva (2012:77), “substantial form is a constitutive part of a naturally subsistent thing”.
11. Petrus Hispanus addresses this issue in another part of the commentary (I, lec. 4, q. 3 (ed. 
Alonso, 262)), where he defends, in terms of dialectical reasons, “gratia disputationis”, the 
existence of a unique substance. Nevertheless, pluralism is his real position; cf. Pontes 
(1964:199-2), Meirinhos (2011:49-51).
12. Sententia cum questionibus II, lec. 6, q. 1 (ed. Alonso, 650-6).
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queritur utrum anima uegetabilis et sensibilis prout sunt in eodem differant 
secundum substantiam. […] Solutio. Ad hoc dicendum est quod quidam 
ponunt quod anima uegetabilis et sensibilis sunt eedem secundum substan-
tiam et differunt solum secundum potencias differentes secundum maiorem 
subtilitatem et minorem. Intellectiua uero differt ab illis per essentiam et 
potencias et operationes, unde ponunt quod in homine sunt due anime dif-
ferentes secundum substantiam quia uegetabilis et sensibilis non differunt 
secundum substantiam set solum secundum potencias. Dicendum est autem 
quod anima uegetabilis et sensibilis in eodem et in diuersis differunt secundum 
substantias et uirtutes et operationes tamen maior diuersitas est inter animam 
intellectiuam et ipsas quam inter ipsas ad inuicem13.
These substantial forms relate to one another, causing a hierarchy in which 
the most elevated and spiritual form rules the inferior as the motor of the group. 
In the case of the human being, it is the intellective that rules the ensemble:
Alterius enim speciei est uita in homine et in aliis, quia in homine regulatur ab 
anima rationali et completur. In bruto autem completur a sensibili, in planta 
autem a uegetabili et sic habet diuersas completiones secundum speciem, et 
ideo differt secundum speciem in istis. Similiter hec operatio sentire regulatur 
et completur in brutis a sensibili, in homine ab anima rationali14.
In contrast, if in unification the role of the intellective is decisive, the 
non-intellective virtues will be essential to the union of the soul with the body, 
which occurs as the result of the joint action of the soul and the body in com-
munication:
Dicendum est quod operationes anime sensibilis omnes communes sunt. Set 
communitas operationum forme est duplex, quia quedam est communitas 
forme operationum secundum quam forma non habet propriam operationem 
sine materia […]. Alia est communitas operationis forme in qua forma com-
paratur per materiam, sicut per instrumentum, et materia simul participat 
operationes influentes a forma, et hec iterum est duplex, quia quedam oper-
atio dicitur communis materie et forme, quia forma recipit inicium suarum 
operationum a uirtutibus corporalibus, non tamen operatur mediante corpore 
nec organo, et sic operationes possibilis intellectus communes sunt. Secundo 
modo dicitur operatio communis materie et forme, quia forma operatur medi-
ante materia, sicut mediante instrumento et recipit dispositiones mediantibus 
partibus materie, et sic operationes anime sensibilis communes sunt. Set hoc 
est adhuc duobus modis, quia quedam operationes anime sensibilis dicuntur 
communes que habent ortum a parte materie, sicut sompnus et uigilia, que 
incipiunt a corpore et terminantur in animam, quedam habent ortum a parte 
anime et terminantur ad corpus, ut sensus et ymaginatio. Et omnes istas oper-
ationes exercet anima sensibilis mediante corpore et partibus eius. Et propter 
hoc dicuntur communes15.
13. Ibidem q. 2 (ed. Alonso, 659-61).
14. Sententia cum questionibus I, lec. 4 q. 4 (ed. Alonso, 268).
15. Sententia cum questionibus I, lec. 6, q. 14 (ed. Alonso, 98-9).
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The operations of the sensitive soul are common with the body. Indeed, the 
etymology of the adjective ‘communis’ indicates the meaning of active co-au-
thorship (munus: “function”, “duty”), and this active communication with the 
body is clear in the operations of sensibility because the operations could never 
exist without the intervention of the body. Indeed, sensibility is a substantial 
form that uses the body as an instrument. In turn, the body is a diverse and 
complete substance, a positive entity with its own determinations16, and not 
a simple metaphysical co-principle, which also contributes to determining 
the operations of the sensibility. This joint action with two agents, the soul 
and the body, produces two types of communes operations: those that depart 
from the body and end in the soul, such as sleep and sleeplessness; and those 
that depart from the soul and end in the soul, such as the sensible actions, 
which are closely related to their ascribed organs and, in the last stage, with 
the dynamics of the elements.
Owing to this communication between substances in the sensible opera-
tion, the body and the soul could be in intimate contact. The same commu-
nication reaches the intellective virtue as well, because the possible intellect 
communicates with these sensible virtues, which are related to the body17. Due 
to the community of this starting point, the agent intellect develops its prop-
er intellectual activity without relation to the body because, by its own action, 
the intellect thinks, free of corporeal matter and of the body:
Similiter intellectus agens in quantum illuminat phantasmata in possibili 
intellectu dependet a phantasia, sicut ab eo supra quod operatur. In quantum 
autem intelligit non dependet ab ea. Et notandum est quod cognitio intellecti-
ua non dependet a phantasia nisi eo modo quo dependet a sensitiua. Sensitiua 
enim sit per accidentia, intellectiua autem per uera rei principia18.
In summary, the disparity of active principles, which this doctrine of the 
plurality of substantial forms involves, is associated with a dynamic under-
standing of the different realities, which compose, through active communi-
cation, the unity between the soul and the body without denying the multi-
plicity of substances. In the background of this complex view, the 
communicatio between different souls allows for conceiving a mediate relation, 
which saves their substantial independence. This mediation indicates that there 
is neither contamination nor ontological mixture between them. Nevertheless, 
16. See Bazán (1969: 34): “Si la forme de corporéité est une forme substantielle — et l’étude 
du P. Zavalloni prouve qu’il en est ainsi — alors le corps est une réalité à laquelle rien ne 
manque dans l’ordre de la substance”. Cf. as well Zavalloni (1951: 419).
17. “Et sic intellectus possibilis dicitur esse communis et eius operatio, quia dependet a fantas-
matibus et uirtutibus sensibilibus quantum ad specierum receptionem, non quantum ad 
operationem supra species receptas. Sic ergo patet quod anima intellectiua habet propriam 
operationem que est ipsius intellectus agentis, operatio ipsius possibilis communis est et in 
quantum per potentiam potentialem habet anima respectum ad corpus et ad ea que regit 
ad inferiora, et in quantum per illam disponitur ad cognoscendum primum per suos effec-
tus et per posteriora”, Sententia cum questionibus I, lec. 6 q. 1 (ed. Alonso, 296).
18. Sententia cum questionibus I, lec. 6, q. 3 (ed. Alonso, 302-3).
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it is possible to conceive that, by virtue ofthese relational dynamics, the vege-
tative form communicates its vital properties to the sensitive, and in turn, the 
sensitive communicates the sensed and imagined to the intellective virtue. In 
contrast, it is clear that the intellective communicates with the inferior forms, 
ruling them and imposing order. Then, unity from multiplicity is produced, 
which is not, in any case, unity in the category of substance.
Dicendum est quod non propter hoc sequitur quod tres differentie anime 
sint una substantia, set quod solum una sit superior ad alias que illas regu-
let et secundum cuius regulationem et exigentiam alie operantur. Et hec est 
intellectiua, et hec in eodem corpore sicut in homine quia in alio non habent 
ordinem19.
The soul’s simplicity, defended by Petrus Hispanus at several moments in the 
commentary20, should be understood as spirituality, a property shared by these 
substances. Stricto sensu, to speak about a unique soul only has sense in refer-
ring to the aforementioned order. In addition, the soul appears as a unity in 
the context of science by virtue of its generic definition, in which the soul is 
defined as the principle of the actions that exist in the animated body21: 
Dicendum est quod unitas in differentis anime est triplex: quedam est unitas 
earum in subiecto et hanc habent a corpore et hec est unitas materialis uel 
etiam hanc habent a composito in quo sunt. Est alia unitas ipsarum que est 
in substantia anime et hanc unitatem non habent differentie anime in hom-
ine set solum uirtutes que sunt eiusdem diffinitione habent hanc unitatem 
sicut uirtutes sensibiles inter se habent hanc unitatem in sensibili. Non autem 
differentie anime. Est tercia unitas que est in corpore et hanc habent inuicem 
differentie anime prout sunt in eodem sicut in homine et ordo tenet eas et 
unit eas secundum quem ordinem in corpore nate sunt se habere, unde sicut 
in maiori mundo ordo tenet et conseruat res et formas rerum similiter ordo 
tenet et conseruat istas differentias anime in corpore22.
* * *
19. Sententia cum questionibus II, lec. 8 q. 3 (ed. Alonso, 709). Cf.: “Alterius enim specie est 
uita in homine et in aliis, quia in homine regulatur ab anima rationali et completur. In 
bruto autem completur a sensibili, in planta autem a uegetabili et sic habet diuersas com-
pletiones secundum speciem, et ideo differ secundum speciem in istis. Similiter hec oper-
atio sentire regulatur et completur in brutis a sensibili, in homine ab anima rationali, et sic 
habet diuersas completiones secundum speciem” LI, lec. 4 q. 4 (ed. Alonso, 267-8). Cf. 
Pontes (1964: 203-4).
20. Cf. Sententia cum questionibus I, lec. 2, q. 7 (ed. Alonso, 230): “Hoc autem est difficile et 
propter hoc est difficile in scientia cognoscere quidditatem anime. Alia autem causa est a 
parte anime propter simplicitatem eius. Est enim remota a cognitione nostra, quia simplex 
est non cadit in eam nisi per operationes suas. Est ergo duplex causa: prima est […]. Secun-
da autem causa est propter simplicitatem anime”. Cf. also Sententia cum questionibus I, lec. 
4, q. 2 (ed. Alonso, 260); etc.
21. Cf. Sententia cum questionibus, QP3, q. 6.1.5.1, the solutio (ed. Alonso, 148).
22. Sententia cum questionibus II, lec. 6, q. 1 (ed. Alonso, 657).
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The role of this communication is absent or minimal in the views in which 
either the body or the soul does not exhibit the character of full substantiabil-
ity. Thus, William of Auvergne, in his work on the soul (c. 1240)23, empha-
sized the unity of the rational soul, minimizing to the limit the active aspect 
of the body and its incidence in the non-intellective forms of the soul. Accord-
ing to him, the instrument is necessary, but the operation does not depend on 
the instrument but on who uses the instrument, the human soul24.
Another position was assumed by Albert the Great, who, despite rejecting 
the plurality of spiritual substances, explained the unity of the potencies by 
means of communication, which preserves their differentiation25. The intel-
lect, in his action, communicates with the sensitive faculties, but it does not 
communicate in any case with the body in a direct manner. It can only be 
conceived as an indirect communication, insists the Doctor Universalis. For 
both Albert the Great and Petrus Hispanus, the “contact” between the body 
and the soul is to be found in the vegetative and sensitive forms: 
Et ideo aliud esse diximus communicare corpori et aliud communicare ei quod 
communicat corpori in operatione. Possibile enim est, quod substantia incor-
porea existens in corpore ut actus corporis communicet corpori. Et possibile 
est, ut non communicet corpori, sed communicet communicanti corpori. Et 
possibile est, ut neque isto neque illo modo communicet, sed habeat opera-
tiones, quae nullam ad corpus habeant dependentiam26.
Despite the differences amongthe aforementioned authors, all of them 
conceived of the soul or souls as complete substances. Therefore, the problem 
of the body-soul relation and the unity of the human being remained in the 
background. 
Fully aware of the root of this difficulty, Thomas Aquinas rejected the 
doctrine of the plurality of forms, restoring, via Aristotle, not only the unity 
of the soul but also the unity of the human being. According to Aquinas, the 
soul with its potencies is the unique subsistent form of the body. The substan-
tial unity of the human being is preserved27. Thomas Aquinas’ psychological 
23. In: Guilelmi Alverni Episcopi Parisiensis Opera Omnia, eds. F. Hotot, B. Le Feron. 
Orléans-Paris 1674.
24. Cf. Moody (1975: 28-34).
25. “Una igitur est substantia, in qua uniuntur omnia haec sicut proprietates naturales, quae 
potentiae naturales uocantur” (Albertus Magnus, De anima I, 2, 15, ed. Stroick, 59b).
26. Albertus Magnus, De anima I, 1, 6, ed. Stroick, 12a. Cf. ibidem, below: “Taliter autem 
distinguendo communicans corpori et communicans ei quod communicat corpori, euita-
bimus errorem Alexandri, qui dicebat in omnibus animam communicare corpori et ideo 
non esse separabilem a corpore. Nos enim ostendemus in sequentibus quod id quod com-
municat non corpori, sed ei quod est communicans corpori, secundum se est separatum 
neque corrumpitur nisi secundum quid et non simpliciter”.
27. Cf. Bazán (1997: 96): “In his Questiones disputatae de anima (Questions on the Soul), Thom-
as Aquinas reached a definitive position concerning the nature of the human soul through 
a process that included both an overcoming of Aristotelian hylomorphism and a rigorous 
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doctrine manages to simplify the explanation of the body-soul’s relationships 
with the help of the Aristotelian doctrine itself, and he has no need to turn to 
some type of development of a communication of substances. 
In fact, it is not in the field of psychology but of theology that Aquinas has 
been considered one of the thinkers of the communication of properties, 
applied to describing the mystery of the Incarnation and the two natures of 
Christ, both divine and human (cf. ST III q16 a8). Later, but in the same vein, 
Luther would develop theoretically the communicatio idiomatum, defending 
the two natures of Christand real communication between them (Cf. Ngien, 
2004: 54-68, and Strzelczyk, 2004: 12-223)28.
Concluding Remarks
The implementation of the idea of communication in psychology can be 
explained by the same reasons by which this concept is provided in Christian 
theology. The presence of the communicatio or communicantia in one or anoth-
er field of speculation points to the same difficulty, namely the multiplicity of 
natures within unity. In one case, the unity of the soul and the human being, 
and, in the other, the unity of the three persons in the Trinity. 
For some medieval thinkers who accepted the plurality of substantial 
forms, such as Petrus Hispanus, the problem of the unity of the human being, 
composed by two realities that are ontologically diverse, is restricted to those 
parts where the flesh and the spiritual are in contact. According to Petrus 
Hispanus, this contact occurs in the vegetative and sensitive forms, in which 
communication with the body is performed — a communication between 
substances or realities that today remains difficult to explain.
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